The NBI I: An introduction

The tensions surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam are symptomatic of a wider pattern of contestation throughout the rest of the basin. A singular precious resource with a mass divergence of vested interests that all believe that their way is the best way. As many of these differing interests lie within many different jurisdictions, it is unsurprising that a transnational authority has arisen. Enter the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). Like many intergovernmental platforms, critics have often pointed at its inability to find a sufficient balance between effective localised knowledge and effective transboundary litigation (Teshome, 2009). Nevertheless, the NBI has received considerable international backing and with the increasing drive for economic and infrastructural development that an increasing number of the riparian countries are looking to engage with, some form of transboundary negation platform has become inescapably necessary.

Before the establishment of the NBI in 1999, there were earlier efforts towards cooperation in the Nile River Basin. In 1995 the Nile River Basin Action plan was designed and in 1997, the World Bank, in conjunction with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the UNDP encouraged an opening of dialogues between the riparian countries in light of the increasing stresses of development on the Nile. In 1998, except for Eritrea, the other 9 riparian countries engaged in dialogue and for the first time, multilateral communications were formally recognized. In 1999, what would come to be known as Nile- COM was established as the first formal council for Nile Basin disputes, and later on in the same year was renamed the Nile Basin Initiative.

In June 2001, the NBI had its first reveal to an international audience in Geneva where the conference mustered 85 million USD of the aspired 180 million USD to kick-start the campaign. Much of the funding came from Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. Although the desired allocation of funds wasn't acquired, the conference in Geneva signaled a promising future for the validity of the project with the approval from many developed nations. In November 2002, albeit with financial assistance from the World Bank, a legally recognized Secretariat was established in Entebbe, Uganda (Kags, Al., 2005). This now reaffirmed, in writing at least, that any agreements made between the riparian countries would be recognized by international law.

The NBI is comprised of a few components. Most notably, the highest decision making body being the Nile-COM (council of ministers), and the Technical Advisory Commitee (Nile-TAC) which closely supports this. In the Nile-TAC each member state is represented by two senior professionals who are key in drafting the ever changing ‘Strategic Action Plan’. As riveting as it sounds, it is actually very interesting because the plan represents a fairly recent example of how such organisations do need to put in place some sort of mutual ideology to fall back on. Ironically, what appears to be some vague mumbling of fanciful collective ideology has a very practical purpose when it is used to ‘measure’ the validity of member states’ actions (Sileet, T. et al, 2007).

The Strategic Action Plan is effectively the operating directive of the Initiative. It is comprised of two sub programmes that illustrate what the Initiative hopes to achieve;

The First is the Shared Vision Programme (SVP) that is a basin wide mandate consisting of seven projects, these being

1)    Applied Training

2)    Confidence Building & Stakeholder Involvement

3)    Efficient Water use for Agricultural Production

4)    Transboundary Environmental Action

5)    Socio-Economic Development & Benefit Sharing

6)    Regional Power Trade

7)    Water Resources Planning & Management

As we can see, such a programme promises a lot but as with all such things, the proof is in the pudding, i.e. how effective are these measures?

The Second is the Subsidary Actions programme (SAP) that has the primary goal of encouraging joint investments at the sub basin levels: The Eastern Nile Subsidary Action Program (ENSAP) and the Nile Equatorial Lake Subsidary Action Program (NELSAP). Apart from Kenya and Egypt, the remaining eight countries are among some of the least development countries in the world, which can cause difficulties when some parties have more financial capacity than others. This is a juncture that we will investigate in subsequent blogs.

All in all, it appears difficult to contest the endeavors of the initiative. However, actions do normally speak louder than words and the relative success or failure of the NBI ultimately lies in its ability to be an effective political mediator.