The Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Part I: The Context
The River Nile's popular perception is inextricably linked to Egypt. From an early age children in schools up and down the country are taught to marvel at the technological advancements that the Egyptians brought into the world with regards to water management, to such a point whereby one could almost be lulled into believing that they were the only benefactors of the Nile, or at least the only rightful ones.
This, as we well know is not the case. As we wind down past Luxor and the Aswan High Dam, we find Egypt's southern neighbours, who have for all intensive purposes been portrayed as the second and third fiddles in this estuarine relationship. Sudan and Ethiopia have up until recent history been comparatively docile in negotiations but as intentions to develop have increased along with economic growth and political consolidation, the Nile has become emblematic of transboundary water disputes, with Egypt very much concerned as to the integrity of future downstream water flows.
According to Swain (2011), Ethiopia is the source to 85% of the Niles water and is naturally looking to maximise its riparian entitlements. Endeavors to capitalise on the river have caused such tensions came to a head with the conception of The Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Unsurprisingly there was resistance from Egypt. In 2011, the Egyptian government threatened the use of military force if construction of the project commenced. The debate is bureaucratic and multifaceted, but I will look to elucidate the main points of the discourse below.
Initial Justifications: Hydroelectric Power & management
Situated on the border of northern Ethiopia and south Sudan in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, the GERD is articulated as being necessary for the growing energy requirements of the region. It would be a major producer of hydroelectric power for both itself and its neighbours, along with being vital for flood regulation and sediment control.
Flow debates
Evaporation rates in the Egyptian desert are high. This has led to various lines of enquiry suggesting that overall supply to Egypt could increase if water is stored behind the GERD, as the Ethiopian Highlands have lower comparative humidity and evaporation rates (Gebreluel, 2014).
However, the GERD will supply Sudan with an opportunity to promote downstream irrigation along the Blue Nile. Such a move could permanently reduce the amount of water reaching Egypt (Link et al., 2012).
Next Week I will look at the conflict resolution mechanisms, and the 'successful talks' that occurred in late 2015.
