In the first instalment,
we had a brief look at the overall scenario, in order to indicate the magnitude
of the project taking place, and to suggest the complex chains of contingency
that are present in vast multi stakeholder, trans boundary riparian
relationships.
The
end goal of this blog is to postulate potential solutions to the political
impasses that have arisen out of Ethiopia's desire to change their water usage
behaviour in order to improve their rural development strategies. However,
before we do this, we must assess the existing political hydro-economy, to help
us understand how why the existing relationship is the way it is, and to see if
this can help inform us as to what direction this geopolitical discourse is
headed (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006).
- What is the conceptual
interpretation of the existing relationship?
Ethiopia's
construction of the GERD marks a pivotal juncture in the remodeling of the East
African geopolitical landscape. Apart from being a highly complex infrastructure
project from an engineering, economic and ecological perspective, perhaps more
prominently it marks the beginning of an epoch with which a reorientated power
dynamic can emerge between the riparian stakeholders on the River Nile.
'Despite Ethiopia having the highest volumetric contribution to
the Nile River flow, Egypt has maintained hydro-hegemony over the basin for
several decades on the basis of historical claims and colonial
agreements.' - (Nasr & Neef, 2016: p.969)
The use of hegemony traditionally
evokes notions of oppression. Understood in this sense it can be interpreted
that Egypt has projected its once markedly superior economic and political
imaginations on to its riparian counterparts where it has looked to secure its
own vested interests first, based on legal precedence set in existing
agreements made under British colonial rule (Gebreluel, 2014).
- Why is the political relationship shifting
now?
You
would be hard pressed to find non-partisan views that denounce the validity of
Ethiopia's rights to development endeavours, although the political timings and
mobilisation of the surrounding discourses appear to have been undertaken with
a great deal of consideration by the Ethiopian authorities. Their decision
to construct the GERD was announced only a few months before the deposal of the
former Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. Coincidence or
political opportunism, either way it gave the Ethiopian authorities initial
leverage with a disorientated Egyptian water ministry.
Secondly, and perhaps
most pertinent in highlighting the complexities of trans boundary water
disputes, is the way in which arguably neither Egypt nor Ethiopia are the most
pivotal players in the story of the GERD. Sudan, Ethiopia’s western neighbour,
despite traditionally placing itself as a primary ally with Egypt has arguably
undergone ‘a recent shift in loyalty towards Ethiopia’ (Nasr & Neef, 2016).
Maybe it is because both
Sudan and Ethiopia are pursuing transformations of their rural development
strategies, or maybe it is a mutual disdain for their northern neighbour,
either way a convergence of interests between the two countries has become
increasingly apparent with Sudan set to benefit handsomely from the irrigation
prospects that the GERD is promising to deliver on the Blue Nile. Egypt can no
longer act as dismissively as it once did, the political landscape has shifted,
and Sudan are evidently more than happy to side with the party that can pander
to its interests (S. Umbadda, 2014)
- In what ways is this relationship continuing
to develop?
Recent developments
around the construction of the dam have demonstrated that power relations are
in a constant state of re-negoitiation, with everybody jostling for a seat at
the table. As is the trend in modern trans boundary disputes, the word of the
day is collaboration and international consultancy expertise has most recently
been summoned in the forms of French firms BRL and Artelia to organize a tripartite
that can signal a truce between Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt with regards to
usage.
Perhaps most important
in these talks is the US’s refusal to be involved in the talks. The US has been
a longstanding ally with Egypt, who have relied on their presence heavily to strongarm
geopolitical outcomes in the region. However, now they are on their own as the
US does not want to jeapordise its relations with other governments in East
Africa, most likely due to their historic willingness to opt for Chinese
support instead of their own (Warner et
al. 2013).
However, although
initially frosty at the end of 2015 with significant hurdles along the way, as
of October 2016, the GERD treaty has been signed with provisos of the
investigation carried out by Artelia giving feedback as to its relative
potential scope for success or failure.
We will investigate the
platforms or lack thereof, through which these discourses have been formed in
the next episode.
References
Hala
Nasr and Andreas Neef (2016) Ethiopia’s Challenge to Egyptian Hegemony in the
Nile River Basin: The Case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Geopolitics,
21:4, 969-989
G. Gebreluel, Ethiopia’s
Grand Renaissance Dam: Ending Africa’s Oldest Geopolitical Rivalry? The Washington Quarterly 37/2 (June
2014) pp.25-37.
S. Umbadda, ‘Agricultural
Investment Through Land Grabbing in Sudan’ in J. Gertel, R Rottenburg, and S.
Calkins (eds.), Disrupting Territories:
Land, Commodification and Conflict in Sudan (Rochester, NY: Boydell and
Brewer 2014) pp. 31-51
M. Zeitoun and J.
Warner, ‘Hydro-Hegemony – a Framework for Analysis of Transboundary Conflicts’,
Water Policy 8/5 (2006) pp. 435-460.
J. Warner, A. Sebastian, and V. Empinotti, ‘Claiming (Back) the
Land: The Geopolitics of Egyptian and South African Land and Water Grabs,
Ambiente & Sociedade June 2013 pp. 1–24.
